COMMISSION
MEMBERS

Justice Javed Iqbal
President

Abbas Khan
Member

Ashraf Jehangir Qazi
Member

Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed
Member

ALJAZEERA
of material retrieved from the OBL Compound does suggest OBL was to a degree actively planning Al-Qaeda’s future operations. This is what exposed his couriers to electronic interception. Moreover, currently the country was crawling with foreigners all over the place acting as the eyes and ears of foreign intelligence services.

492. As for the possibility of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s presence in Pakistan, Al-Qaeda had directed its operators to move towards towns and cities away from isolated places. It was possible for him to be somewhere in Pakistan. The ISI was working hard to locate him. However, the US was continuing to withhold vital information from the ISI and could be planning another assault. The May 2 attack was motivated by domestic political considerations, and another attack could be similarly motivated in an election year in the US. This was militarily possible because of the technological differential between the militaries of the two countries i.e. military asymmetry.

496. The DG said the reality for Pakistan was not defined by the might of the US. It was defined by the fact that “we are a very weak state and also a very scared state. We will take anything and not respond. It all boils down to corrupt and low grade governance.” The Commission was “faced with a problem not so much of specific individual or institutional failure, but with a problem of collective and systemic failure.” There was “apathy at every level; in every sector of national life.” Pakistani society was “deeply penetrated.” The media was “practically bought up” and nearly “every one of our elite was purchasable.” A US intelligence officer had the gall to say “you are so cheap…we can buy you with a visa, with a visit to the US, even with a dinner…we can buy anyone.” Accordingly, “we are a failing state even if we are not yet a failed state.”

497. The DG said the ISI knew that HVTs had been caught in towns and cities. In Karachi there were “no go” areas where the ISI knew foreign miscreants lived. But the police dared not venture
“497 – The DG said the ISI knew that HVTs had been caught in towns and cities. In Karachi there were “no go” areas where the ISI knew foreign miscreants lived. But the police dared not venture there. The situation was increasingly becoming true of Lahore and other cities.

In Lahore the police protected those who attacked the Qadianis last year (2010) and even directed them to the hospital where the wounded were being treated. The provincial government had been informed of the situation but it took no heed of the advice and information provided by the ISI. No guards were assigned to the hospital as venal political influence intervened everywhere."